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CIVIL COURT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF KINGS: HOUSING PART H
397 E. 49tfi STREET LLC
Petitioner- Landlord,
-against-

L&T Index No. : 084003/19
DECISION/ORDER

MICHAEL IGLESIAS AND NATASHABUSGITH
Respondents-Tenants,
Address:

397 EAST 49THSTREET
APT. 3A
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK 11203

Recitation, as required by CPLR § 2219( a), of the papers considered in the review of
Respondent's Cross-Motion 1•

PAPERS
Respondent's Notice of Cross-Motion, Attorney's Affirmation in
Support & Exhibits ("A" - "C")

NUMBERED

Petitioner's Attorney's Affirmation in Opposition

3,

1, 2

Respondent's Attorney's Reply Affirmation in Further Support
of the Cross-Motion
4
Upon the foregoing cited papers, the Decision and Order is as follows:
This is a nonpayment proceeding commenced in 2019 and first appearing on the Court
calendar on December 10, 2019. Respondent Michael Iglesias ("respondent") appeared through
counsel while respondent Natasha Busgith has never appeared. Nevertheless, the parties agree
that respondents have vacated the premises and that petitioner is back in possession of the
subject premises . In support of her cross-motion to dismiss the proceeding base upon
repossession by petitioner, respondent's counsel asserts uncontested that her client respondent
Michael Iglesias first attempted to surrender in October 2020 prior to substitution of the new
Owner on October 27, 2020 (see footnote #1 below), but was advised to wait for a new super to
return the keys. Ultimately, he surrendered at the end of November 2020.
1

The motion in chief was to substitute 397 East 491h Street LL as petitioner in this proceeding based upon a transfer
of ownership just prior to the Covid epidemic and subsequent to commencement of this proceeding (see the March
I 0, 2020 two attorney stipulation where respondent's counsel is so advised). The motion was consented to on
October 27, 202 0 during the Covid Epidemic (see Order dated October 2 7, 2020).

In support of the cross-motion respondent claims that to the extent the new owner is
entitled to rental atTears it should be relegated to a "plenary" action. Petitioner opposes the crossmotion and argues it is entitled to proceed to seek those an ears in the form of a money judgment
within the context of this summary proceeding, notwithstanding that possession of the premises
has already been obtained. The Court does not address this issue from the standpoint of whether
a monetary claim fails to state a cause of action under CPLR §321 1.
The issue actually before the Court is whether the Comt maintains j urisdiction to possibly
issue a money judgment for arrears in light of repossession of the premises by petitioner during
this proceeding2 • At the outset the Court notes that the new Owner has never established its right
to seek a money judgment for the arrears which comprised the underlying petition, either in
support ofits earlier motion in chief to be substituted as petitioner or in opposition to this crossmotion. In support of its prior motion the petitioner attached an "ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS"
and an "ASSIGNMENT OF LANDLORD/TENANT PROCEEDINGS". Each of these
documents in pertinent part, respectively state as follows:
"(the "Assignor") ... hereby assigns unto the Assignee all of the Assignor's
right, title and interest as landlord in those certain leases and extensions
thereof, if any ... and the rents arising therefrom, between Assignor
(or Assignor's predecessor) and the tenants set forth on Schedule "A"
annexed hereto ... . "
"(the "Assignor") ... hereby assigns unto the Assignee all of the Assignor's
right, title and interest as Petitioner in those certain proceedings identified in
Schedule "A " annexed hereto and made a part hereof, currently pending in
the Civil Court of the City of New York County of Kings (the Actions"), between
Assignor (or Assignor's predecessor) and the tenants/respondents set forth on
Schedule "A " ... "
Both documents are devoid of any "Schedule "A" attachment". Based upon this deficiency alone
the cross-motion should be granted. The Court, however, addresses the legal issue as well
concerning the Court's ongoing jurisdiction, or lack thereof.
Recently the Appellate Term Second Department in two separate cases ruled that once a
Judgment of possession issued leading to eviction of a tenant, the Court no longer maintained
jurisdiction to amend the judgment to include a monetary judgment, see Lee v Green World
Cleaners 1, LLC, 61 Misc 3d 155(A) (2018); Goldburd v Langer, 62 Misc 3d 140(A) (2019).
Petitioner's Counsel attempts to draw a distinction between proceedings where a Judgement of
Possession has already been obtained and the repossession has occurred (either through surrender
or eviction) and proceedings where the tenant voluntarily vacates a premises during the
proceeding without a post-trial judgment or stipulated judgment of possession being reached.

2

A foll h·ial would be necessitated a respondent raised issues of Laches, Rent Overcharge and Breach of the
Warranty of Habitability.

2

The Court rejects this distinction and notes that those cases where "amendments" of
Judgments were disavowed by the Appellate Courts due to a lack of ongoing jurisdiction, also
sought a monetary judgment similar to what petitioner now seeks. As stated by the Appellate
Term Second Department in Lee v Green World Cleaners 1, LLC, 61Misc3d155(A), 112
NYS3d 415 (2018):
"The summary proceeding had terminated and was no longer pending following
the entry of the final judgment of possession in favor of landlord and tenant's
subsequent removal from the premises (cites omitted). Once the proceeding
terminated, the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain landlord' s motion to ,
in effect, amend the final judgment to include a monetary award ....notwithstanding
the attempt in the stipulation to reserve landlord's right to so move. " 3
Similarly, in Goldburd v Langer, 62 Misc3d 140)A); 112 NYS3d 859 (App. Term, 2nd dept.
2019) the Court again noted:
"Under the circumstances presented, the summary proceeding had terminated
following the entry of the final judgment and tenant's subsequent removal from
the premises (cites omitted) ... "
"because the proceeding had terminated and was no longer pending, the Civil Court
lacked jurisdiction to entertain landlord's motion, in effect, to amend the final
judgment to include a monetary award pursuant to the stipulation"4 .
To best understand why the "termination" of a summary proceeding should occur
whether a tenant is forcibly removed from possession or voluntarily surrenders during the
proceeding requires a focus on the history of the summary proceeding as well as the purpose of a
nonpayment proceeding. In Patchogue Assoc. v Sears, Roebuck & Co., 37 Misc3d 1, 951 NYS2d
314 (App. Term, 2nd Dept., 2012), cited by petitioner, the Court did just that. As noted therein:
"The legislature created summary proceedings in 1820 in order to give landlords a
' simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of [a] premises in
cases where the tenant refused upon demand to pay rent, or where he wrongfully held
over without permission after the expiration of his term' (cites omitted)".
"While, initially, it could be determined that rent was due and unpaid in a summary
proceeding, no money judgment for rent could be awarded. It was not until 1924 that an
amendment to the Civil Practice Act allowed the recovery of rent in a summary
proceeding, so long as certain conditions were met."

3

To distinguish a voluntary surrender from this appellate posture would have a chilling effect on voluntary
vacatures as the tenant would have no impetus to surrender if the current litigation simply continued. Furthermore it
would have a chilling effect on settlements further clogging the courts especially during and after the Covid
epidemic.
4
While petitioner relies heavily on Harbor Tech LLC v Correa, 134 NYS3d 652 (civ Ct., Kings Co. 2019), it is not
binding on this Court.

3

"Even now, generally ' a monetary award in favor of landlord can only be made
concomitant with an award of possession' in a summary proceeding"
Furthermore, the Court in Patchogue acknowledged the primary reason for a nonpayment
proceeding (or any other summary proceeding):
"Regardless of a landlord's intent, the purpose of a nonpayment summary proceeding
is to recover possession of the subject premises, and the 'power to fix the rent due is an
incidental matter' (Matter ofByrne v Padden, 248 NY 243,248, 162 NE 20 [1928]; cf
Jones v Gianferente, 305 NY 135,139; 111NE2d419 (1953] ["This summary
proceeding .... .is of purely possessory character. .. "].
For ali of the foregoing reasons the cross-motion ofrespondent is granted, and the proceeding is
dismissed without prejudice to petitioner seeking its monetary claims in a plenary action and
subject to respondents' defenses. This constitutes the decision and order of the Court.

SO-ORDERED

fi';/"/h

DATED
April 6, 2021

KENNETH T. BARAN~
J.H.C
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